@c live at Opensound. IPA, Lisboa, 28 June 2012.
@c live with Carlos Zíngaro at Natal dos Experimentais. Passos Manuel, Porto, 14 December 2012.
@c live with Aki Onda & Gert-Jan Prins at Atlantic Waves. ICA, London, 10 November 2007.
A short text on LIA’s new work, “Homage to Bridget Riley”.
The live recording of our July 2017 live set in Parva is now published at parva.bandcamp.com.
“GML123”, a piece commissioned for the Robotic Gamelan of Casa da Música’s Digitópia, will premiere tomorrow and be presented for four days at the Casa Aberta event.
I’ve written a short text about LIA’s new work, “Floralis Digitalis”.
The Journal of Science and Technology of the Arts, published by the Portuguese Catholic University in Porto, has just released a special issue with a selected set of extended papers from the xCoAx 2017 conference. The issue includes works by Hanns Holger Rutz, Frieder Nake and Susan Grabowski, Pedro Alves da Veiga, Rodrigo Hernández-Ramírez, Pinelopi Papadimitraki, Luís Eustáquio, and Daniel Temkin, and was guest-edited by Luísa Ribas, André Rangel, Mario Verdicchio, and myself.
It’s open access at artes.ucp.pt/citarj/
I’ll present a paper with Rui Penha at the Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Information.
In this communication, we will argue that artistic creations made by artificial minds will most likely lay beyond our ability to understand them, perhaps even beyond our ability to recognize them at all as artistic creations. We will assume that the emergence of consciousness in artificial minds is possible: the fact that the belief in that hypothesis is not consensual is irrelevant to the argument being proposed. Additionally, we will assume that the artistic creation we are referring to is one made by the artificial mind’s own volition and not the one that—either procedurally, generatively or interactively—is made based on (or directed towards) an anthropocentric view of art.
It is inevitable that we start by facing the problem of the definition of art. A definition that circumvents the ontological question will not be very useful in this context, since a definition such as e.g. the institutional theory of art allows any artefact or proposition to be considered as art solely by being recognised as such by someone acting on behalf of the artworld, not establishing, however, any criteria for such recognition. We will therefore start from the definition of art as embodied meaning, and from its relation with embodied cognition, to show that there is a binding of artistic creation to the subjective experience of existing in a natural and cultural world through a human body that is born with a foretold death.
We will furthermore look at the reasons that justify the difficulty to understand artistic manifestations that are not inscribed in our own cultural matrix or previous experiences. Finally, we will try to demonstrate that the best we can aim at, as human beings standing by an artistic creation by another species, is to an understanding of what could have motivated another human being to create such a work. As such, we shouldn’t be able to understand an artistic creation originating by an artificial mind with a physical experience of the world that differs from our own, even if they have a privileged access to our culture. The boundaries for this incomprehension, that we believe to be inevitable, are therefore those of the human mind.
The proceedings of xCoAx 2017, the fifth conference on Computation, Communication, Aesthetics, and X, are now available at 2017.xcoax.org. Edited by Luísa Ribas, André Rangel, Mario Verdicchio & Miguel Carvalhais. Designed by Luísa Silva Gomes. ISBN 978-989-746-128-6. 389 pages.